



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No 700688.



# TAKEDOWN

Identify . Prevent . Respond



UNDERSTAND THE DIMENSIONS OF ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORIST NETWORKS FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR FIRST-LINE-PRACTITIONERS AND PROFESSIONALS

## Deliverable D2.1

### Literature exploration and open access bibliography



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## Project

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## Deliverable

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## Executive Summary

Based on a critical reflection of relevant literature, the review shows that both organized crime and terrorist networks become more and more complex and the diversity of the forms organisations is increasing. Organized crime groups are becoming more and more flexible and divers. Globalisation and the internet have produced international networks, which rely on a broad portfolio of criminal activities that created experts and professionals within the networks. However, despite the globalisation of organized crime activities, ethnicity and kinship still plays a role both at a larger and a smaller scale, as research on local distribution or protection networks has shown.

Terrorist networks are very much based on ideology and identity, with social marginalisation and institutional change as main drivers of engagement. Regarding the structures, research has shown that the form of organisation is changing from centralized organisations towards networks of cells that act more or less autonomously. This development is facilitated by the digital communication technologies, with terrorist networks having their own experts for encryption and secure communication.

Other and especially recent approaches emphasize the similarities between organized crime and terrorist networks. Although connections between the phenomena are recognized, critical scholars point out that there are fundamental variations and hence it is crucial to separate them analytically. Organized crime for example is aiming at the accumulation of wealth, whereas terrorist networks are mainly focussing on political or ideological goals and are using criminal activities primarily to finance their structures and attacks.

Organized crime and terrorist networks represent a serious threat for the European Union as well as on a global level. However, as research has shown, over 90 per cent of terrorist attacks are taking place in non-European countries. Nevertheless, as a conclusion several policy and institutional obstacles for tackling organized crime and terrorist networks are apparent. First, there is a significant *Lack of Cooperation* between the EU-member states regarding the implementation of supra-national policies. Second, there is a *Lack of Skilled Technical Staff, Expertise and Tools*. Only few countries have the technologies and the experts for tackling cybercrime. Third, as recent terrorist attacks in Europe showed there is a *Lack of Communication* between national authorities, which interferes with the aim of tracking criminals or preventing attacks.

## 1. Introduction

Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks (OC/TN) are major challenges for the EU. Many different stakeholder groups are involved in creating awareness, preventing, identifying and intervening in case of risk or threat. But in order to develop better strategies and instruments, we still need a deeper understanding of these phenomena.

TAKEDOWN will create new insights on OC and TN by using a multidimensional modelling approach including social, psychological, economic and cultural aspects as well as prevention activities and response approaches. Based on these insights, practical toolkits as well as an Open Information Hub will be developed for practitioners and the public. A digital Solutions Platform will furthermore aim at increasing the cooperation between law enforcement agencies and security solution developers.

With this multi-level approach, the project will not only enhance the knowledge on OC and TN, but it will also develop digital and non-digital toolkits as well as solutions for more efficient and effective prevention, intervention and response strategies.

In order to develop tools for supporting many different stakeholders, a profound scientific basis is needed. Hence, D2.1 is conceptualized as a review of the literature on the topics of organized crime and terrorist networks. It would have been a daunting task to include in this review all the relevant work produced on the two subjects by academic researchers, journalists, investigators and many others. It would also have distracted us from the core objective of TAKEDOWN, namely the identification of policies, responses and actions aimed at preventing and tackling both forms of criminality. For this reason the works discussed below were selected on the basis of the following delimiting criteria:

*Analyses of the causes, structures and activities of organized crime and terrorist networks are examined only if they are relevant to, and linked with, the identification of tools to prevent and tackle both forms of crime.*

This will be of paramount importance when, in the second stage, a questionnaire will be designed and the empirical part of the research will be carried out.

The present literature review is divided into three main sections, respectively pertaining to organized crime, terrorism, and hybrids forms combining elements of both. The first two sections, in their turn, focus on the following areas: causes, structures, activities, and prevention-response measures.

## 2. Organized crime

### 2.1. Causes

From the perspective of the **Positivist School of Criminology**, the variable ‘tradition’ plays a crucial role in the analysis of organized crime. For example, as Lombroso (1971: 389) argued: ‘It seems to me that the high persistence of some wicked associations such as the Mafia, the Camorra and brigandage depends first of all on their long-term existence, in that the continuous repetition of our acts transforms these acts into a custom and therefore into a norm’. A range of subsequent interpretations follows into this path, associating organised crime with variables such as ‘backwardness’ or ‘archaism’. These are normally analyses that address organised crime from a ‘cultural’ perspective (among the most celebrated are Hess, 1973 and Hobsbawm, 1971). Belonging to the same cluster are contributions focusing on the perpetuation of organised forms of criminality, which is said to derive from the lack of popular stigma attached to those involved. Subcultural theorists, for instance, would argue that members of criminal organizations are not regarded as individuals belonging to a distant and censurable social universe, nor are they associated with immorality or elicit contempt (Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

In the **anomic tradition**, while limited levels of crime are deemed to reinforce the unity of the law-abiding society, some forms of delinquency are regarded as dysfunctional. Although Durkheim never wrote about organised crime, we can assume that this type of delinquency is to be included among those forms of antisocial activity indicated by the author as causing damage that transcends the functional level.

Merton's extension of anomic theory, however, includes organised crime among deviant adaptations of the ‘innovative’ type. He argues that the dominant culture makes incompatible demands upon those who occupy the lower strata of society. ‘On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of large wealth (...) and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally’ (Merton, 1968: 200). Those who pursue the official goal of money and success but lack the institutional means to achieve them, therefore, ‘innovate’, in the sense that they adopt alternative illicit means. In Merton's view, Al Capone represented the triumph of amorality over morally prescribed failure.

An important causative theory emerges from the **Chicago School of Sociology**, namely ‘social disorganization’ (Downes and Rock, 1988). This crucially attributes the emergence of organized crime to the decline of informal social control. According to this theory, the degree of organization of illegal structures (be they youth gangs, groups of pimps, gambling syndicates or others) is dependent on the degree of disorganization of society. In other words, their organization is a function of the distance that separates them from other social groups (Thrasher, 1927; Shaw, 1930). Sociological studies conducted in Chicago's ‘delinquent areas’ unveiled micro-societies of immigrants that were perfectly organized (Whyte, 1943). Deviance, in this perspective, endorses a surrogate social order, a vicarious system which is nevertheless a social system in its own right. In this system, it is perfectly logical that a gangster is not met with disapproval (Landesco, 1969). He is a product of his surroundings in the same way in which the good citizen is a product of his environment. Therefore the problem, as indicated by Whyte (1943), is not the lack of organization within those particular micro-societies, but the lack of meaningful relationships between these enclaves and society as a whole.

It is worth noting that the causes sketched so far revolve around the idea that criminal groups adopt deviant solutions to resolve their status problems. Such groups adhere to a delinquent subculture, learn techniques and justifications for their acts, and ultimately operate in contexts where legitimate opportunities are scant. These causations, on the other hand, have been criticized because they apply with particular force to exponents of one specific class. '[They] may be termed differential magnifications, the tuning of the analytical lens being to an almost exclusive degree on the "subordinate" cultures, with a corresponding neglect of the "dominant" cultures' (Downes and Rock, 1988: 164).

Categories such as 'low self-control' have also been mobilised: these imply that there is no need to design a specific theory to account for organised crime, and that individuals lacking self-control are the major protagonists of illegal activity, of whatever nature this may be (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). By contrast, organized crime groups have been described as possessing a 'high' degree of self-control, which enables them to act as service-providing organisations (McIntosh, 1975). Among the goods provided, trust and protection are singled out as paramount. These, which should be supplied by the state, may under certain circumstances become the preserve of private entrepreneurs, namely organized crime. Therefore, this type of crime is purported to be an industry for the supply of private protection and the distribution of trust to economic actors who would otherwise be unable to interact safely (Gambetta, 1992). In the case of the mafia, for example, its strength as an industry for the supply of protection and trust is deemed a consequence of traditional popular distrust of the official agencies, and foreign domination before them. This line of analysis is also endorsed by Varese (2010), who proposes to consider the organised crime phenomenon as part of the broader category of governance. His suggestion is that a crucial distinction should be drawn between producers of goods and services, and suppliers of forms of regulation, protection and governance. The form of governance alluded to is one that usurps the functions of the state in societies where sovereign rule is inadequate, a form of governance from below which extends power 'beyond the state and into the realms of civil society' (Edwards and Levi, 2008: 379).

The variable trust returns in other elaborations, for instance, when it is linked to the necessity on the part of organizations to diffuse information and improve efficiency. This necessity, however, may make organizations more vulnerable to detection law enforcement, hence the trade-off and the search for an optimal balance between information, trust and the structure through which it is delivered in illicit markets (Baccara and Bar-Isaac, 2007).

Other authors have emphasized that organized criminal activity may be less the result of poverty, underdevelopment or lack of self-control than of its opposite: affluence, development and the control of resources. In other words, social disadvantage, lack of socialization, low self-control and so on are suitable analytical tools only when one tries to depict organized crime as a distinctive form of social pathology, that is to say as the result of a 'deficit'.

To **summarize**, it is noticeable that the **interpretation of organized crime** shows an extraordinary continuity in time. For over a century its etiology has been based on categories such as tradition, absence of the state, pathology and lack of control, relative poverty, and delinquent subcultures. All these categories fall, to different degrees, within a paradigm of deficit whereby the causes of crime originate in a deficiency, be it one of control, of socialization, of opportunities, of rationality, and so on (Ruggiero, 1996).

These variables omit to consider that, in order to reproduce itself, organized crime is bound to establish some external relationships with society at large. The nature and strength of these external relationships are regarded as crucial for an understanding of the causes of organised crime (Scarpinato, 2004; Dino, 2008; Dino and Pepino, 2008). From this perspective, organised crime perpetuates itself while ‘dissolving’ within both the dominant social structure and culture. And by doing so it is presented with new opportunities.

Many of the controversial issues outlined so far stem from the **difficulties** met by **organized crime scholars**. As Block (1991) puts it, the study of organized crime has been fascinated by conspiracy theory, a fascination which leads to the depiction of monolithic, impenetrable, culturally hermetic groups of criminals. He also suggests that the term ‘organized crime’ should be abandoned altogether in favour of the term ‘illegal enterprises’. This approach is implicitly adopted by scholars analysing organized crime, and crime in general, as an economic activity (Becker, 1968; Andreano and Sigfried, 1980).

Authors also focus on macro-structural factors and political-economic contexts which are regarded as facilitators of the genesis of organized crime. **Contemporary structural explanations** of the causes of organized crime generally posit that the last three decades of rapid global market liberalization, privatization and financialization, coupled with welfare reform and austerity measures, have created destitute areas across the world where organized criminal groups have developed and flourished (Chin and Godson, 2006; Mazzitelli, 2007; Shaw and Haysom, 2016; Campbell, 2011; Ferreira, 2016; Silverstone and Whittle, 2016). Put more succinctly, these macro political-economic processes, or what is in shorthand referred to as neoliberal globalization, have activated the:

*‘Criminogenic potential of economic, political, legal, and cultural asymmetries, as well as [created] new such asymmetries [...]. These asymmetries cause crime by furnishing opportunities for misconduct, by generating motives for actors to take advantage, and by weakening social control’* (Passas, 2000: 17).

In brief, it is argued that neoliberal policies and their well-documented effects in increasing gross socioeconomic and political inequalities, along with the weakening government regulations and declining public services (Chang, 2001; Harvey, 2005; Chomsky, 2011; Ellwood, 2011), generate the conditions for criminal opportunities to emerge (Chin & Godson, 2006; Ferreira, 2016; Mazzitelli, 2007; Tzvetkova, 2008; Wang, 2013).

## 2.2. Structures

Research has focused on the internal **relationships** of organized groups, hence the emphasis on units such as ‘crime families’ (Godson and Olson, 1995). This approach derives from old North American characterizations which identified organized crime as one single, wide group of Italian migrants, whose hunger for money and power was regarded as alien to the society of the US (Kefauver Committee, 1951; Cressey, 1969; Fijnaut, 1990; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). Subsequently, the structure of organized crime has been depicted in the simplified formula: ‘two or more persons conspiring together to commit crimes for profit on a continuing basis’ (Hagan, 1983). Such structures, small or large as they may be, are described as self-perpetuating criminal conspiracies hinging around families or bureaucracies, whose lay out is rigidly hierarchical and whose formal rules determine specialized and segmented functions.

A plausible understanding of the structure of organized crime hinges on **quantitative and temporal aspects**. So, for example, the number of individuals involved in a criminal group is said to determine the organizational degree of that group (Johnson, 1962; Ferracuti, 1988). In this way, organized crime is seen as different from conventional crime for the larger scale of its operations (Moore, 1987). Focusing on the time-span during which illegal activities are conducted we return to the notion of ‘continuing basis’, whereby the death or incarceration of a member of organized crime does not stop the activities in which the group is involved. Ianni (1972) seems to rely on both the quantitative and the temporal variable when he describes a complex web of kinships tying families together through alliances and intermarriages, a web strengthened by an equally complex pattern of godparent-godchild relationships. The author depicts crime families as being linked together into composite clans. ‘Some clans obviously form compact, interlocked regional groups with frequent intermarriages cementing the alliances; all are related by some common interests’ (Ianni, 1972: 172). He concludes that this clan-like organization makes criminal groups seem very similar to one another, a circumstance that has led observers to maintain that organized crime is a highly structured, national or even international conspiracy.

Organized crime may, at the same time, be formed of **flexible** and **diversified groups**. Such a structure is necessary due to the peculiar necessities prompted by its condition of illegality:

- first the necessity, while remaining a ‘secret’ organization, to exert publicly its coercive and dissuasive strength, therefore requiring an equilibrium between publicity and secrecy that only a complex structure is able to acquire;
- second, the necessity to neutralize law enforcement through omertà, corruption and retaliation;
- finally, the need to reconcile its internal order, through specific forms of conflict control, with its external legitimacy, though the provision of occupational and social opportunities (Cohen, 1977; 1990).

Other hypotheses around the structure of organized crime revolve around the concept of **professionalism**. It is therefore suggested that its members acquire skills and career advancement by virtue of their full-time involvement in illegality. On the other hand, it has been noted that organized crime also needs a large number of unskilled criminal employees (Ruggiero, 2012), hence the paradox of the exploitation on the part of powerful organized groups of the growing misery and deprivation that they themselves produce (Ferrajoli, 2010).

A study conducted by Varese (2010) on the structure of organized crime addressed the following features: **specialization**, **hierarchy** and **illegal enterprise**. The data set he analyzed showed that in the decade up to 1949, one out of three definitions mentioned ‘specialization’, as did one out of four in the subsequent decade. The 1950s saw the variable ‘hierarchy’ prevail in academic and institutional definitions, while later the notion of illegal enterprise took shape, suggesting that criminal groups operate in extremely uncertain environments where regulations and, indeed, organization itself are problematic (Smith, 1991). Hence the phrase ‘disorganized crime’, which depicts criminal groups as unable to control illegal markets, crowded as they are by small enterprises, ephemeral coalitions and short-lived partnerships (Reuter, 1983). From this perspective, hierarchical control of members is hard to achieve and choice of partners is mainly limited to highly reliable individuals. When partnerships are formed, these take the form of temporary alliances among

independent operators who are far from being incorporated in structured, monopolizing organizations (Haller, 1990).

Researchers led by macro-structural concerns, after suggesting that neoliberal policy inputs and outputs have created large areas of economic deprivation and weakened social control, pinpoint how organized groups compete in illicit markets and consolidate their regional control by:

- establishing and/or working with legitimate enterprises for the purposes of conducting criminal activities (Milhaupt and West, 2000);
- exploiting weak regulations and ineffective judicial systems (Tzvetkova, 2008);
- fostering links with low to mid-level officials, particularly those from the criminal justice system, who overlook their illicit activities and provide immunity in exchange for bribes (Wang, 2013);
- possessing the skills required to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, including the ability to expand operations transnationally (Silverstone and Whittle, 2016).

In mapping the structure of organized crime, a supplementary element is found in the literature, one that suggests the **distinction** between **professional and organizational crime**. The former is also described as 'crime in association' and is characterized by a horizontal structure in which agents operate as peers, planning schemes together, executing them and sharing proceeds. Here, the division of labour within the groups is technical, based as it is on the specific skills possessed by participants. By contrast, 'crime in organization' implies a distinction between planning and execution, a wage relationship between a patron and an agent, and a degree of invisibility: agents may ignore the motivations and the very identity of those recruiting them. In classical terms, the division of labour is in this case of a social nature (Ruggiero and South, 1995; Ruggiero, 2000).

The distinction just mentioned is complemented by further observations relating to the activities carried out by organized crime in the official arena. Organized criminal groups who gain access to the legitimate economy and the official political apparatus seem to complete the evolution hypothesized by Peterson (1991), whereby this type of crime traverses a number of **successive stages**: a predatory, a parasitic, and finally a symbiotic stage. While some (or most) groups may fail to undergo a similar evolution, thus stagnating in conventional criminal markets, others may instead succeed, therefore straddling legality and illegality. The legal-illegal nexus has some structural implications and can be captured if organized crime is regarded as social organization, which refers to a network of the two following **types of relational networks**:

- First, social organization can be viewed as an association, a network of individuals who form some sort of culturally homogenous group;
- Second, social organization can be seen as a series of transactions, namely a network of individuals involved in a common activity irrespective of their social and cultural background.

Transactions range from brief encounters to elaborate, rigid, and highly coordinated undertakings. Ultimately, if we view social organization in terms of association, we emphasize the internal structure and cohesiveness of groups. On the contrary, if we view social organization in terms of transactions we emphasize the structure and modality of joint activities.

Some scholars, but also investigators, choose the first route, thus describing the criminal groups as separate entities constituted by cohesive enclaves and characterized by specific cultural codes.

Others opt for the second route, therefore focusing on the links the criminal group established with external, mainly official actors with whom joint activities are carried out (Arlacchi, 1983, 1994; Armao, 2000; Lodato and Scarpinato, 2008; Gounev and Ruggiero, 2012).

Those who choose the second route highlight the capacity of organized crime to polarize markets through the use of violence, thus implying that the 'military' aspect of this type of crime are still very important. Others look specifically at the alliances and partnerships between organized crime, the official economy and the political world, and therefore suggest that organized crime combines forms of conventional criminality with a variety of white-collar offences. This happens when proceeds from illicit activities are invested in the official economy, where members of criminal groups 'learn' the techniques and the rationalizations of their white-collar counterparts. In this case, it is appropriate to talk about a number of exchanges and a mutual entrepreneurial promotion in which the different actors engage.

Hence it is suggested that we are now faced with **criminal networks** rather than criminal organizations. The development of such networks is mainly associated with deregulated markets in which unorthodox practices already prevail, to the point that violations are the norm. In contexts in which political representatives and business operators act illegally, citizens and social groups of any composition may well follow suit, thus imitating in their illegal practices of their elite.

In this respect, the definition of a '**mafia method**' which is spreading among conventional criminals and white-collar criminals alike is gaining increasing currency. Some scholars, for instance, tend to abandon the very term 'mafia' and replace it with the term 'mafia method', implying that a series of principles, modalities and values are spreading from criminal organizations throughout the official world, and from the latter to the former, affecting the concepts of justice, morality and enterprise (Dino and Ruggiero, 2012).

### 2.3. Activities

In the analysis of Europol (2011a), based on law enforcement information from across the EU, there are **five criminal hubs** in Europe:

- North West, with the centre of gravity in the Netherlands and Belgium;
- North East, with the centre of gravity in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and the Russian Federation;
- South East, with the centre of gravity in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece;
- Southern, with the centre of gravity in Southern Italy;
- South West, with the centre of gravity in Spain and Portugal.

These hubs are deemed **concentrations of illegal logistics** which facilitate flows of illicit goods and in which criminal groups operate thanks to their proximity to destination markets, commercial and transport infrastructures and major migratory routes. Observing such illegal concentrations, there is a sense that organized crime is growing increasingly diverse in its methods, structures and impact on society.

*'A new criminal landscape is emerging, marked increasingly by highly mobile and flexible groups operating in multiple jurisdictions and criminal sectors, and aided, in particular, by widespread, illicit use of the Internet'* (Europol, 2011a: 5)

Criminal groups are also said to expand their activities, with some becoming distinctively poly-commodity in their operations, and with the most successful developing **diverse portfolios** of criminal business interests (UNODC, 2010). Strong levels of **cooperation** are detected between different organized groups, transcending national, ethnic and business differences. This ‘collaborative atmosphere’ is attested by the common practice of barter, whereby illicit goods are exchanged rather than bought and sold, while transactions, it is assumed, tend to jettison the use of cash. A connected tendency is the intensified use of transport infrastructures, with criminal groups taking full advantage of global movements of commodities and growing mobility of people. With the economic crisis, it is felt that organized criminal groups will have new opportunities to recruit disadvantaged individuals, who may find in illicit occupations a ready-made substitute for legitimate work. Finally, some thought is devoted to the role played by ‘specialists’, namely legitimate actors who are willing to cooperate with organized criminal groups and facilitate their activities in some way.

This general picture is accompanied by a detailed examination of the different **sectors of illegal activities**, with drug distribution, as one would expect, regarded as paramount. **Poly-drug trafficking** appears to be increasing, as it ensures greater resilience to fluctuations in supply and demand while maximizing profits (EMCDDA, 2010). Meanwhile, although the majority of heroin entering Europe comes from Afghanistan via Turkey and the Balkans, the proliferation of direct transport and commercial links between producing and distributing countries has contributed to **diversification in route and trafficking methods**. Hence the recent development of the Black Sea route connects Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine to Romania and the Baltic countries. The Balkan route itself shows unprecedented flexibility, as heroin consignments transit through Greece before reaching Bulgaria and Romania and thus Central Europe. The Kosovo region is the operating base of ethnic Albanians involved in trafficking into Central and Western Europe. In the North West hub, Turkish groups are said to be active, along with Dutch and Moroccan organizations, whereas in the North East hub Lithuanian groups service the growing heroin market of the Russian Federation.

*‘Transportation of heroin is often paid for with the commodity itself, creating local markets in countries of trafficking routes. Because heroin commands a higher price in destination markets and large distribution centres, the smaller amounts distributed en route are often highly adulterated’* (Europol, 2011a: 9).

Spain and Portugal remain the main European entry points for cocaine, which is also imported into the Continent, through West Africa, by Moroccan groups who utilize the North African route established for cannabis. A prominent role in the organization of cocaine trafficking, however, is now taken by West African criminal groups, who hold direct connections with South American producers. Such connections have also been established by groups operating in South East Europe and in the Balkans.

Synthetic drugs offer organized criminal groups the advantage that production may be very close to consumer markets, thus offering a highly cost effective activity. Ecstasy is mainly produced in the Netherlands and Belgium, but tends to be replaced by ‘designer drugs’ and ‘legal highs’ such as methylone, mephedrone, fluoramphetamine and others (EMCDDA, 2010). Synthetic drugs are in high demand in countries where cocaine prices are high, hence producing groups, for example, in Poland and the Baltic States are expanding. Cannabis and qat distribution complete the information provided by Europol, which singles out West African, Albanian and Lithuanian criminal organizations as the major poly-drug groups.

**Illegal immigration** is another important area for organized crime activity, which responds and adapts to changing law enforcement strategies. Some groups may limit their role to the provision of forged travel documents, while others may offer transport services. Yet others may direct illegal migrants to employers or employ them themselves once they have reached the country of destination. Official reports tend to overlook the instances in which illegal migrants require a mere service helping them move across borders, and focus mainly on the victimization aspect of this illicit business. For example:

*‘Traffickers recruit their victims mostly in deprived, disadvantaged or poorly integrated sectors of society, offering them employment abroad. Many victims are lured with bogus offers of legitimate employment. Others agree on the type of work they are expected to perform, but are deceived by the actual circumstances they find on arrival in the destination country.’* (Europol, 2011b: 10)

The most powerful criminal groups in this area are identified as those capable of controlling the entire trafficking process, from recruitment to transportation, from the provision of forged documents to illegal or criminal employment. The most frequently reported groups involved in human trafficking are, in descending order, Roma, Nigerian, Romanian, Albanian, Russian, Chinese, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish organized crime groups. Migration flows from North Africa and the Middle East are said to provide criminal groups operating in Europe with opportunities for exploitation, while trafficking is also linked to the commission of welfare benefit fraud, which implies large profits and low levels of perceived risk of detection. Finally, the use on the Internet is associated with the transnational marketing of sex workers.

**VAT fraud** is a highly lucrative offence, accounting for an estimated five billion euros in damage to European taxpayers each year (European Commission, 2010). Due to the nature of VAT fraud, which allows numerous traders to exploit the system without affecting each other’s profits, organized groups are unlikely to compete in this illicit activity, rather, they most often tend to cooperate by exchanging information and techniques. **Credit card frauds** in Europe are also attributed to organized crime groups, who ‘collect data from payment cards by means of attacks on online payment systems, data breaching and skimming (magnetic strip copying and PIN capture)’ (Europol, 2011a: 23).

An attractive alternative to drug trafficking is **cigarette smuggling**, with organized crime choosing destination countries among those with high taxes on tobacco, such as Scandinavian countries, Germany and the UK. In turn, an alternative to the smuggling of genuine cigarettes is the manufacture of counterfeits, whereby well-known brands are illegally produced and marketed. Poland and some Baltic countries are singled out as significant sources of counterfeit cigarettes. For instance,

*‘In Poland, a highly specialized and organized crime group has been involved in the illegal production of cigarettes supplying the German black market. Cooperation between Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish criminals has been a key feature in this case: companies in Ukraine delivered the tobacco, other ingredients passed through the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, while production took place in Poland.’* (ibid: 25)

The Euro is yet another target of organized crime (European Central Bank, 2011). Groups engaged in the **counterfeiting** of this currency are characterized by rigid organizational structures and high degrees of division of labour. Participants include investors, printers and distributors, while Italy and Bulgaria are deemed the foremost countries of the activity. Chinese organized groups, instead, are

credited with performing a major role in commodity counterfeiting, with goods entering the EU via all major seaports before being distributed throughout the Continent. Counterfeit medicines are included among such goods.

Other areas covered by official reports relate to **weapons trafficking** and **environmental crime**. The former, it is stressed, takes place through the same routes used for drug and human trafficking, and consists mainly in small or second-hand firearms. The latter implies the dumping of hazardous substances and involves mafia-type structures with sufficient resources to manage the disposal of large-scale waste.

Similar to the trafficking in human beings and other crimes, discussed above, **cybercrime** belongs to the new forms of criminality that pose a major threat to fundamental rights and national and international security. The transnational nature of cybercrime and their specifics makes it increasingly attractive to the organized crime and terrorist networks.

Finally, **money laundering** constitutes a crucial area of investigation, where organized crime continues to use traditional, established methods such as cash couriers, while availing itself of diverse types of shell companies. Moreover,

*‘The availability of many new laundering possibilities offered by modern technology has provided transnational groups with new ways to further their criminal interests. In some Member States, investigations into suspected money laundering activities continue to be hampered by the requirement for a predicate offence.’* (Europol, 2011a: 32)

A preference for offshore banking locations is noted, and organized criminal groups are also seen as skilled users of new technologies and of services (insufficiently regulated) offered by digital currency operators such as Webmoney and Liberty Reserve.

**Digital and networked technologies** are the object of the analysis proposed by Wall (2015), who suggests that through their use organized crime may be required to change the dynamic of its operations. In this respect, disorganized forms of criminality are said to emerge, also termed ‘distributed’ models of organization as opposed to hierarchical crime groupings. Empirical work accompanies these elaborations, which offer critical views within the cybercrime debate (McCusker, 2006).

In conclusion, it is worth identifying some of the most significant points addressed so far:

- First, official descriptions of organized crime in Europe posit that cooperation among groups is an established fact;
- Second, that the collaboration of some official experts is, at times, required for some organized criminal activities to be performed. For example, the production of synthetic drugs is said to involve specialists in the fields of organic synthesis and retail pharmacy;
- Third, that the main activities in which organized criminals engage are, typically, conventional illegal activities servicing black markets.

Let us now compare these descriptions with the **findings** of other **research studies**, mainly conducted on a national level, which are presented below in the form of rough sketches.

Official sources indicate that collaboration among different organized groups is increasingly likely and, implicitly, that alliances make tasks viable on the transnational scene. There is some truth in

this, although qualifications are required when facing specific **national contexts**. In the Netherlands, for example, the situation is characterized by the co-presence of distinct groups, which may cooperate, but only on the basis of a precise division of roles. Such groups, in fact, are unlikely to form organic, long-term partnerships, let alone establish collegial, intra-ethnic memberships. Ethnicity is also a key variable in Greece, although ad hoc partnerships may be influential in some criminal activities. In France and Italy, on the other hand, indigenous criminal groups may act as gate-keepers, allowing access to illicit markets to non-nationals only at pre-established financial costs. In both countries, however, newcomers may also operate in illicit market sectors dismissed by upwardly-mobile local groups. In Italy, moreover, rather than partners, the newcomers may well provide ‘criminal labour’ to locally established criminal networks. Mixed ethnic groups may be taking shape in Spain, but are extremely rare in Russia, while in the UK what is vividly manifest is a situation of competition and succession among ethnicities, rather than their amalgamation.

In brief, independent research describes an extremely nuanced situation, with **fluid, multiple dynamics** guiding the ways in which groups create **associations** and **affiliations**. The emphasis placed on criminal transnationalism is at the origin of the hurried generalizations found in official documents, where it is taken as a given that criminal groups move across national boundaries with the purpose of establishing illicit colonies abroad. Hence, the urge for such groups to form close consortia across borders is presumed. On the contrary, it has been noted that criminal organizations are mainly stationary, because it is at the local level that they provide their services and goods while accessing resources (Varese, 2001, 2011). It should be added that the way in which groups and individuals assemble is determined by the **conditions** governing illicit markets, as well as by the **relationships** between these markets and the legitimate ones. In this sense, transnational criminal activity may be successful where the formal-informal interface is remarkably large and the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate are already substantially blurred. In such contexts, alliances and multi-ethnic criminal membership between groups find a favourable environment, like legitimate corporations find in deregulation the opportunities to pursue their multinational interests.

As for the ‘**collaboration of experts**’ mentioned by official agencies, this is not limited to the cases of drug production highlighted above. In some European countries organized crime does not merely seek the scientific expertise of official actors, but attempts, and often manages, to ‘assemble’ with political and economic operators who occupy the legitimate domain. Entire sets of power groups are targeted, including entrepreneurs, local and national political representatives, the police and the judiciary, with a view to forging with these sectors more or less stable, illegal, partnerships (Gounev and Ruggiero, 2012).

This leads to a final consideration around **official accounts**. These appear to be focused primarily on conventional criminal activities, thus neglecting the overlaps and joint initiatives that organized criminals undertake with members of the white collar community. In this sense, official concerns are mainly directed towards ‘pariah’ forms of criminal enterprise, namely those whose options in markets are limited. These enterprises are in need of the goods and services, including protection, that more powerful criminal enterprises can deliver. On the other hand, they are incapable of accessing the official economy to a significant degree. More powerful variants of organized crime, which expand their activities into the licit arena of business, both maintain their characteristics of organized crime and adopt those typifying corporate actors. They are offered the opportunity to engage in value-adding partnerships with legitimate entrepreneurs, in mutual economic promotion

and through the exchange of services. Criminal groups who do not ‘make it’ into the legitimate arena are denied those ‘multiple social affiliations’ which would improve their chances (Blau, 1994). The way in which they assemble socially will confine them to the underworld.

In some countries we are faced with **networks of professionals** whose long-term apprenticeship has produced the skills, the rationalizations and, crucially, the reputation allowing them to operate in a variety of illicit markets. In other countries we witness successful forms of organized crime reaching out to the official world. The different **power** wielded by organized crime in specific national contexts reminds us of an ironic observation made by Landesco (1969) with respect to the Chicago criminal scene. In the Chicago of the 1920s, success was measured at funerals of mobsters: if when you are alive you can hide the identity of your friends, but you can hardly do so when you are dead. Those funerals revealed the connections of organized crime with the institutions: mourners included businessmen, lawyers, politicians, and a sprinkle of police officers. On the other hand, countries which do not display such ‘assemblages’ may not be paragons of honesty, rather, they may possess an elite which is inaccessible and reluctant to share its illegality with outsiders.

In conclusion, research into organized crime may avail itself of new directions emerging from the observations made above. The consortia involving conventional and white collar criminals demand a slight alteration of Sutherland’s (1983) theory, which implies that techniques and rationalizations are learned within specific homogeneous **enclaves** or **professional groups**. In some European countries, on the contrary, learning processes appear to cross the boundaries of social groups, as criminal know-how is transmitted to a **variety of actors**. In other words, techniques are exchanged and skills enhanced within an economic arena inhabited by legal, semi-legal and illegal businesses. Law enforcers may also want to pursue these new investigative directions.

## 2.4. Measures

It is time to deduce some **policy implications** that might be gleaned from the analyses sketched above. Translated into practical measures, policies present themselves as either **social** or **technical measures**, although the two types may come in combined interventions. Let us start with the former and attempt some general considerations around prevention.

**Preventative social measures** derived from subcultural perspectives would stress the importance of educational programmes aimed at spreading civic awareness among the individuals and groups at risk. Such programmes would help develop meaningful relationships between marginalized communities and society at large, encouraging inclusion rather than exclusion. If crime is a form of deviant adaptation or ‘innovation’ (as Merton would put it) chosen by people who lack the institutional means to achieve a dignified life, preventative programmes should strive to provide a minimum of such means.

In a similar vein, analyses emphasizing ‘social disorganization’, namely the existence of enclaves in which deviance and crime are perpetuated, prompt programmes which can dissolve such enclaves, also described as ‘delinquent areas’ into the womb of the law-abiding society. Where ‘delinquent areas’ are closely connected to markets providing illicit goods and services, prevention could opt for the following:

- tackle demand through informative educational campaigns;
- tackle supply by providing viable economic alternatives to those involved;

- legalize some of the illicit goods supplied.

Analyses of organized crime hinging on the variables trust and protection would prompt the obvious measures leading these to be provided by state agencies. The enhanced presence of institutions as guarantors of social interactions would ensue, in a process shaping forms of non-coercive governance.

As we have seen, some research conducted by institutional agencies and independent investigators alike depicts organized crime as ‘employer’ attracting individuals who find no suitable occupation in the official labour market. With legitimate occupations being increasingly characterized by precarious conditions and poor wages, organized crime may well appear as a more appealing labour recruiter. Social prevention, in this respect, should make legitimate work competitive, in ethical and material terms, with work available in illicit economies.

Moving on to what we have termed technical measures, it may useful to start with a concise list of such **measures or policies** introduced in the US and later exported into Europe. Since the early 1970s the FBI and the US Department of Justice have been launching repeated offensives against organized crime. Limited resources, however, have made their action selective, as certain historical criminal groups have been prioritized while emergent ones have been partly neglected (Jacobs and Wyman, 2015). With law enforcement resources increasingly shifting towards terrorism, institutional action against organized crime is now limited to routine intervention based on electronic surveillance, informants and undercover policing. Witness Security Programmes have been in place for decades, when the code of omertà began to break down and turncoats were rewarded with lenient sentences. Prosecutions for tax offenses and asset confiscation have also been widely used. From the procedural point of view, although the US does not criminalize mere membership of organized criminal groups, ‘aggressive use of conspiracy and racketeering laws come close to achieving the same result’ (ibid: 536). All of these technical and judicial measures are an emanation of those stipulated by the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

In more general terms, the most common **strategies** employed by **governments** have aimed at ‘dismantling criminal organizations by dismantling their leadership structures in order to fragment them into minor and more manageable groups’ (Ferreira, 2016: 43). These have commonly included a mix of undercover operations, raids, privacy-piercing approaches, freezing and seizing of assets and, increasingly, collaboration with intelligence services and international policing agencies. However, these measures have been largely ineffective in developed countries, while in developing countries they have tended to ‘intensify pre-existing conflicts, turf wars, and generate smaller, less predictable and more violent groups fighting fiercely for smaller turfs’ (Ferreira, 2016: 43). In this respect, some of the literature suggests that ‘efforts to eradicate organized crime should focus on the alteration of institutional incentive structures and the stimulation of competing rights-enforcement agents rather than on traditional crime-control activities’ (Milhaupt and West, 2000: 41). Hence the broad structural **suggestions** emanating from the **European Parliament**:

- increasing public funding for social schemes in underdeveloped regions, as well as for the development of state sanctioned rights enforcement institutions and training of information agents to enhance legal private ordering i.e., “the sharing of regulatory authority with private actors” (Schwarcz, 2002:319);
- implementing economic growth strategies with a view to social integration;

- enforcing and strengthening regulations governing the activities of national and international financial institutions;
- prosecuting money-laundering enablers (financial institutions and executives) according to criminal statutes instead of civil statutes;
- strengthening international cooperation on asset recovery, and harmonizing multilateral agreements on standards and provision of confiscation (see Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3).

As already mentioned, it is very difficult to evaluate the **success of anti-organized crime measures**, particularly when such measures mainly target criminal groups as closed enclaves of socially and culturally homogenous individuals. Following the distinction proposed above, the focus of the technical measures summarily listed seems to be organized crime as 'association'. But assuming, as we have seen above, that such associations do not cease their operations when some of their members are incarcerated or die, assessing how these measures affect the 'transactions' criminal groups establish with the official world is even more difficult. This notwithstanding, the impact of US organized crime policies on foreign jurisdictions is undeniable, if highly controversial.

Many European countries have introduced institutional reforms, created new police units and/or specialised judicial bodies against organised crime , made recourse to informers, treated turncoats leniently, made criminal association an offense and enacted asset confiscation (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2005; Beare and Woodiwiss, 2015; Yordanova and Markov, 2012). For our purposes in this literature review, a detailed presentation of the measures introduced in individual European countries is unnecessary; therefore the following is limited to providing an **overview of the institutional and technical policies in the EU** as a region.

The **Maastricht Treaty** includes articles concerning police cooperation, and although none of them refer to organized crime as such, they do deal with drugs trafficking and other serious forms of international crime (Fijnaut, 2015). The concern of the EU about organized crime has grown incessantly alongside the process of integration. First regarded as an issue to be tackled under the Third Pillar (the intergovernmental pillar), the fight against organized crime gave rise to police and judicial cooperation and new systems and procedures to improve the sharing of information.

In 1990 member states stipulated the **Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime**, which was turned by the Council into a directive in 1991. Under the directive, states were forced to implement legislation against money laundering, 'but also to ensure that their financial institutions would register and report unusual and suspect transactions to the competent authorities' (ibid: 574).

Cooperation among member states stepped up in the aftermath of the assassination of Palermo investigative judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992, and resulted in the establishment of **Europol** in 1995. European concerns around organized crime were also intensified by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the threat of new forms of criminal activity emanating from Eastern Europe (Dunn, 1996).

An Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime was produced in 1997 under the banner of the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, demanding member states to integrate prevention, investigation and prosecution and harmonize their legislations. In a cumulative process, policies and strategies were devised under the successive presidencies of the European Council, and in 1999 **Eurojust** was created, namely a multinational European team of national prosecutors and police officers. A **European Police College**

was founded while a Financial Intelligence Unit tasked with information sharing about money laundering was set up.

Special mechanisms for carrying out the policies against cybercrime were also created: in 2004, the European Network and Information Security Agency (**ENISA**), responsible for supporting Member States in their response to cybersecurity threats and for cooperating with third countries; in 2013 - the European Cybercrime Centre (**EC3**), hosted by Europol, designed to provide operational support to law enforcement agencies from EU Member States and from non-EU cooperation partners to tackle the different areas of cybercrime, including those committed by organised crime groups and/or cyber-attacks affecting critical infrastructure and information systems in the Union.

Despite the adopted legal basis for approximating criminal legislation, including that on the fight against transnational organised crime (The Amsterdam Treaty, 1997 and The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009), no commonly accepted definition of organised crime has been found so far. The EU's **2008 Framework Decision** (Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime, built on the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) provides a definition which is a compromise of diverse legal traditions and could not lead to approximation of legislation. Member States have very different definitions of organised crime and this may complicate their cooperation. The national diversity and the internationalisation of organised crime require vigorous development of the legal regulation of this phenomenon at the national and international level, so as to cover all possible manifestations of this type of criminal behaviour. Therefore, adequate legal framework and its effective implementation are crucial for the achievement of satisfactory results in countering organised crime (Yordanova and Markov, 2012).

No specific technical measures are proposed by the EU, which limits its strategy to general principles and goals. For example, in a document issued by the **Justice and Home Affairs Council**, the priorities for the period 2011-13 were identified as follows:

- weaken the capacity of organized crime groups active or based in West Africa to traffic cocaine and heroin to and within the EU;
- mitigate the role of the western Balkans as a logistical centre for organized crime groups;
- reduce the production and distribution in the EU of synthetic drugs;
- combat all trafficking in human beings and human smuggling by targeting the organized groups conducting such criminal activities;
- reduce the general capabilities of mobile (itinerant) organized groups to engage in criminal activities;
- step up the fight against cybercrime and the criminal misuse of the Internet (Fijnaut, 2015: 586).

## 2.5. Initial Model for Organized Crime

Lastly, based on the literature discussed thus far, the following **working model of organized crime** is proposed. Note that while hierarchically organized, unlike conventional linear models, this model views organized crime as a highly complex and dynamic process. As such, this model does not propose that if A happens then B, C and D will automatically happen. Instead, it proposes complex change, such that in the first bifurcation if A happens then the pre-existing and emerging conditions outlined in B, C and D are more likely to happen and/or become aggravated. But what will exactly

occur, along with the extent of occurrence, will depend on initial variations in the emerging and pre-existing conditions outlined in A.

### *Multidimensional Model of Organised Crime*




Figure 1. Multidimensional Model of Organised Crime

## 3. Terrorism

### 3.1. Causes

Violent conflict has been an object of study in criminology since the very inception of the discipline. Before the word ‘terrorism’ gained common use, early criminologists dealt with both institutional and anti-institutional violence. Classical criminology, particularly the work of Cesare Beccaria (1965) and Jeremy Bentham (1967), regarded **political violence** as a breach of the social contract binding citizens and authority together. The focus of Beccaria, for instance, was on ‘state savagery’ and, at the same time, on ‘crimes of sedition’. He linked institutional violence (torture, capital punishment, assassinations and other forms of state violence) with violent outbursts directed against the state. From a contemporary perspective, we can summarize his thought as follows: excessive state violence provokes violent responses by non-state agents (Beccaria, 1965).

Positivist criminologists studied regicides, romantic murderers and violent anarchists and looked at **social and psychological causes** of political violence. While in general they thought that violent action against the system retained an ‘evolutive’ character, in the sense that it accelerated social change, when faced with specific forms of terrorist acts they judged those acts as the result of monomaniac individuals who would be violent even if not inspired by political beliefs. Their distinction between rebellion and revolution was, in this respect, crucial. The former, in their view, was conduct caused by insanity, moral madness, narcissistic martyrdom or suicidal drive. The latter was an evolutionary process which, without necessarily resorting to violence, aimed at **social change** and improved **social justice**. It is noteworthy that this school of thought formulated a notion of ‘suicide mission’ well before these became common currency in the present times, as they described anarchists who assassinated aristocrats in the middle of the streets as individuals whose principal aim was an ‘honourable death’ or ‘indirect suicide’ (Lombroso 1894; Lombroso and Laschi, 1890).

Functionalist criminology was, of course, inspired by the work of Emile Durkheim, whose seminal study of suicide and homicide offers tools and arguments that can be extended to the analysis of political violence and terrorism. Durkheim associates the rise of homicide with the growth of those collective sentiments whose interest obsessively resides in the group, the family, or the state. The feelings that lie at the base of the cult of such entities may be in themselves conducive to murder. When the family, the group, the state, or for that matter a political idea or a religious belief, appear to be the supreme good, their importance transcends the sympathy and compassion due to the individual or people in general. Like some forms of suicide, terrorism and political violence in general may be the result of excessive integration in a **creed**, an **identity**, or of a strong form of binding to a set of **moral values** (Durkheim, 1996).

Looking at the contributions of the Chicago School of sociology in the first decades of the twentieth century, we find a penetrating analysis that echoes aspects of the contemporary debate. The study of migrants’ communities and excluded groups brought to light the connections between organized crime and political violence. Criminal organizations, while conducting their illicit business, acted as the violent arm of political parties, using terrorist form of intimidation, particularly during electoral campaigns (Landesco, 1969). Rival candidates were attacked or kidnapped, in a climate that turned political competition into violent interpersonal conflict. Subsequent criminological analysis focuses, rather, on collective conflicts, describing societies as composed of competing groups and contrasting

value systems. Political violence, from this perspective, is interpreted as the outcome of **struggles** for the attainment of **material** and **ideological power**. A rigid application of conflict theory would paradoxically suggest that any form of deviance and crime, including terrorism, is the result of contrasting interests between the elite and the underprivileged or of different groups among them.

Symbolic interactionism can be useful for the causative explanation of terrorism. This school of thought examines the relational dynamics that produce harmony or conflict, in other words, how interacting individuals and groups determine their mutual conduct. In this view, state and non-state entities engage in acts of terror when both feel that they have **no space left for peaceful interaction**. For example, the invasion of a country may be followed by resistance in the form of terrorist acts, while terrorist acts may determine responses of a terrorist (extra-legal) nature by states. Moreover, **invasions** may destabilize regimes and trigger sectarian violence. It is estimated, incidentally, that over thirty per cent of the founders of ISIS are former members of the secret services of Iraq, who enact a form of revenge, responding to the invasion of their country with indiscriminate attacks (Lynch, 2015; Gerges, 2015). This imitative dynamic leads us to other contributions around the causes of terrorism.

If the **context** in which **political violence** is performed is itself violent, an escalating process allows the parties involved to devise increasingly violent practices. Such practices take on the nature of terrorism when violence becomes random and organizations using it adopt a concept of collective liability applied to the groups against which they fight. Targets are not precise actors whose conduct is deemed wrongful, but general populations defined by nationality, ethnicity, religious or political creed. Terrorism as 'pure' violence contains elements of what is known as **hate crime**, that is a perception that the victims are representatives of specific communities, and that they are not attacked in their capacity as individuals, but as individuals belonging to a real or imagined alien group. Both terrorism and anti-terrorism may choose 'pure' forms of violence, in an imitative process that rapidly becomes war-like (Witte, 1996; Black, 2004; Ruggiero, 2005).

Terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are linked in this causal chain that exhibits feud-like elements of vengeance, each side answering random violence with random violence. However, this development is said to take place when a considerable cultural and relational distance, along with severe forms of **inequality** and **injustice**, exist between the parties involved. On the other hand, to claim that inequality and social injustice are the main causes of terrorism neglects the fact that there is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed by the United Nations as the poorest, least developed, most unjust and unequal (Laqueur, 2002). As Sen (2015) has argued,

*'the simple thesis linking poverty with violence is empirically much too crude both because the linkage of poverty and crime is far from universally observed, and because there are other social factors (...) Calcutta is not only one of the poorest cities in India – and indeed in the world – it so happens that it also has a very low crime rate.'* (ibid: 165)

**Radicalisation** has been at the centre of recent policy debates on the causes of terrorism as well as of extensive academic research and debates. They explore the different approaches towards understanding the links between radicalisation and terrorism and deal with different forms of radicalisation, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing as well as left-wing radicalisation and the role of the internet in radicalisation processes (Dzhekova et al, 2016). In focus are multitude **models** explaining the process of radicalisation into terrorism and violent extremism, including phase models

and root-cause models as well as different analytical approaches at both individual and group/societal levels, with the most widely used being social movement theories, psychological, social-psychology and integrated approaches (ibid).

From the area of **psychology**, research studies have focused on the processes leading to terrorism, conceptualizing the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase (Moghaddam. 2005). These processes are said to involve individuals who believe they have no voice in society, and in cases of suicidal terrorism to be encouraged by a '**significance quest**' accompanied by various **ideological reasons** (Kruglanski et al, 2009).

Specific research on **right-wing radicalization** has proven that participants in violent action are exposed to racist beliefs during childhood and that extremist groups tend to recruit among marginalized youth who are angry and looking for solutions to their problems. Social class may, however, be irrelevant, as those attracted to right-wing violent organizations are found to be mainly 'dominating authoritarians', who are 'the most prejudiced persons in society':

*'Furthermore, they seem to combine the worst elements of each kind of personality, being power-hungry, unsupportive of equality, manipulative, and amoral, as social dominators are in general, while also being religiously ethnocentric and dogmatic, as right-wing authoritarians tend to be'* (Altemeyer, 2004: 421).

Recent events have led the literature on terrorism to abandon the search for general causations and focus on **radicalized Islamic groups**. An article of Reif (2015) discusses aspects of the phenomenon and the psychology of jihadism. Several studies are presented the results of which demonstrate that social dislocation, identity conflicts, a desire for revenge and traumatising are promoting factors for radicalisation. In the following concepts of deradicalisation and prevention are outlined.

One of the causes identified in the literature is the feeling of 'weakness, irrelevance, marginalization and subordination experienced by Muslim people', combined with the memory of a glorious past of a great transnational civilization (Toscano, 2016: 123). The 'reactionary utopia' of the Caliphate is explained in these terms, namely as the result of frustration determined by the gap between expectations and achievement. The **frustration thesis** seems to apply to both prevailing models of terrorism: 'the fanatic who is outside any appeal to rationality, and the calculating actor who lacks any capacity for human empathy' (McDonald, 2013: 11). Authors advocating the 'new terrorism' model emphasize its pathological aspects, arguing that participants suffer from personality disorder and mental unbalance. On the other hand, terror has also been associated with the search for redemption, with protagonists neither 'fanatic' nor 'calculating', but just enacting redemptive violence that transforms and 'saves' at the same time (Weisbrod, 2002).

Scholars in the area of **theology** have attempted to find in sacred texts the cause of contemporary terrorism. For example, charting the history of the Islamic State since its first incarnation in the seventh century, the following Hadith (a prophesy emanating from the Prophet Muhammad) has been highlighted. Widely accepted among Sunni Islamists, the prophecy states that the history of the umma (the Muslim international community) will go through five phases: first, the prophet himself will rule; then Caliphs will rule according to the Prophet's teachings; then force will be necessary for those teachings to spread; then coercive rules will be established; finally, the time of caliphate will return and usher in the end of the world (Kennedy, 2016; Small, 2016). Against causations derived from religious texts, other scholars have underlined how the Quran is replete with suggestions

around dialogue, peace and the development of harmonious interfaith relationships. There are many passages in the Quran, according to other authors, that destroy the idea, propagated by some, that non-Muslims are infidels and must be eliminated (Horkuc, 2009; Wills, 2016). Finally, the argument has been made that not Islam, but **religion** in general has always played a role in war and terrorist violence, even in advanced secular countries (Buc, 2015; Sacks, 2015; Hassner, 2016).

### 3.2. Structures

Non-state violent organizations must, by definition, adopt **clandestine structures**, although the model with which they present themselves may vary according to **contexts** and in response to **institutional action** (Beck, 2015). In situations where popular support is widespread, terrorist groups may set up **dual structures** composed of an official, legitimate layer of activists and a hidden nucleus of combatants waging armed attacks. This dual structure seems to survive as far as terrorist organizations maintain strong links with social movements and perceive themselves as representatives of aggrieved groups (Combs, 2013; Martin, 2010). Lack of support from such groups who express their contentious politics through visible social movement activity often determines the collapse of terrorist groups, as shown in the cases of the Red Brigades, the Red Army Fraction, ETA and the IRA (Ruggiero, 2010a).

Contemporary terrorist groups have evolved over the last two decades following international events and intensification of institutional responses. In the 1990s, for instance, hard-core militants prevailed in organizations which displayed a high degree of **professionalism** and role **differentiation**. The distance between leaders and adherents was kept to a minimum, and all participants were tasked with specific operations that they were well able to carry out due to expertise and appropriate skills. Recruitment was selective and based, among other things, on proven ideological loyalty, military expertise, possession of resources, range of reliable followers, status and available key contacts. The prevailing model was, therefore, one that echoed the old international political organizations, with a central committee dictating the 'line', establishing the goals, identifying possible allies and drawing a short-term as well as a long-term **strategy**. The latter, of course, was the attainment of power, pursued through the building of strong links among participants, supporting social groups and their allies.

This structure, which concentrates members operating according to the principles of '**authoritarian centralism**', was slowly supplemented by the creation of **cellular units** more or less coordinated among themselves and with increasingly weaker links with the central structure. Attacks by scattered cells started to follow a 'logic' rather than an established 'programme', with copycat action being carried out in contexts which were diverse and isolated from one another. Communication among terrorist cells, in brief, began to revolve around the symbolic nature of the destructive act, a form of signature indicating a common identity. Such terrorist cells, which are still operating now, are devoid of an international reach, but become international thanks to the images they furnish, the imagination they stimulate and the repetitions they encourage. 'Violence increasingly seeks excess and rupture rather than organization and programme' (McDonald, 2013: 168).

In the current phase, the development of '**networks of cells**' seems to constitute the prevailing trend. The core structure, of course, remains and is now located in specific territories acquired by a military force, while peripheral entities are scattered and offer their support in a variety of fashions. Isis is said to adopt Mao's revolutionary warfare strategy, based on the formation of an irregular

army. But while for Mao this army relied mainly on peasants, for Isis it avails itself of the **expertise of jihadists** from previous conflicts mixed with **professional soldiers** and **intelligence personnel** (Whiteside, 2016). Isis has conducted dozens of prison breaks, freeing thousands of veterans, while some 20,000 inmates were released between 2008 and 2010 in rudderless countries afflicted by civil war. This constitutes, perhaps, a major pool of potential recruits, an army born of chaos held by those in command through a **vertical apparatus** and **functional bureaus**. This organizational form is copied largely from al Qaeda, is financially self-sufficient, media savvy, and kept together by a strong leadership. At the same time, small groups of individuals may just plan and execute attacks which seem to be consistent with the strategy of the core organization, with or without the prior assent or a post-facto endorsement by the core organization.

In brief, it no longer seems that terrorism can be imputed to a single, however loosely, organized group. Along with **hierarchical organizations**, there are bands of **followers** who act **outside formal structures** and 'are motivated by feelings and beliefs widely shared among millions of Muslims worldwide (...) The independence of the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2008) from Al Qaeda control or direction is a vivid demonstration' (Blum and Heymann, 2010: 162).

Research on how **foreign fighters** access the battlefield shows that **social networks** are of paramount importance for joining groups involved in violence (Holman, 2016). It should be borne in mind that individuals eager to join terrorist networks pose serious security risks to insurgent entities. Hence the necessity to filter the recruitment process through mediators or facilitators. These not only make the process more opaque to law enforcement but also guarantee a selection of sort of the would-be recruits. Those who are recruited, however, may not always be total novices or amateurs, as their identity and political inclination may already be well known to law enforcers. Think of 'Jihadi John', a young Briton of Kuwaiti descent who grew up in London, a refugee whose family were granted asylum in the UK. A not untypical London youth, interested in drinking and pop music, he turned into a 'psychopathic sadist and sickening killer' (Anthony, 2016: 34). He became the focus of the secret services because of the extensive jihadi company he kept and, after being put under surveillance for some time, he developed a profound grievance towards the British state (Verkalk, 2016). It is not easy to map covert networks, as these are not static and possess uncertain boundaries. An analysis of the network involving the nineteen dead hijackers in the events of November 2001, for instance, concludes that the findings offered, while painstakingly gathered, remain incomplete (Krebs, 2002).

**Recruitment**, in the spreading 'network of cells', may take place in the guise of self-affiliation, with individuals or small groups mimicking the acts that they presume are consistent with the strategy and practice of the organization they would wish to join. The terrorist organization, in this way, can rely both on its own operative members and on a range of sympathizers scattered around the word. The latter, even when devoid of any practical connection with the 'mother' organization, in effect carry out its policy. Isis, for instance, owes its strength not only to its specific military power, but also to the exemplary nature of its acts that may be replicated by 'lone wolves', who feel legitimized to kill after internalizing the deadly philosophy of the organization. An example is the gunman who, in June 2016, killed fifty people and wounded fifty-three more after storming into a gay night club in Orlando, Florida. Omar Mateen was twenty-nine years old and a US citizen of Afghan heritage: he opened fire on partygoers with an AR-15 assault-rifle and handgun. Mateen had never been under surveillance and during the attack he was heard claiming allegiance to Isis (The Guardian, 13 June

2016). Here, hate crime and terrorism combine in the most explosive fashion, suggesting that structures and networks host individuals of varied ideological persuasion and personal motivation.

The **internet** along with the undoubted benefits has become a place where jihadists and terrorists are recruiting their supporters and fighters, doing their propaganda, etc. Exploring the relatively new idea of **cyberterrorism**, scholars conclude that 'global terrorism and cyberspace will converge in a deadly intersection. It is a question of 'when,' not 'if'. Moreover, cyberterrorism is seen as 'more dreadful than terrorism in the physical world, since the enemy may strike without being seen from anywhere in the world and disappear like a vapor trail' (Jaeger, 2004). Some authors define cyberterrorism as 'using computer technology to engage in terrorism' (Brenner, 2006) and divides this use into weapons of mass destruction, weapons of mass distraction and weapons of mass disruption. Subject of research is also the reasons for and the meaning of cyberterrorism, the vulnerable targets of cyberterrorism, the tools of the cyberterrorists, its potential effects, and what can be done to minimize threat (Britz, 2013).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report 'The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes' discusses the means by which the Internet is utilised for terrorist purposes: propaganda, financing, training, planning, execution, cyber-attacks (UNODC, 2012). As 'computer technology complicates the related processes of identifying internal (crime and terrorism) and external (war) threats to social order of responding to those threats', researchers explore the ways for identifying techniques to improve attribution and response processes for emerging cyber threats (Brenner, 2007), ways of guarding against cyber-attacks and of guaranteeing information systems security (Uda, 2009).

The trajectory leading to **more open networks** that are facilitated by the internet appears to be confirmed by the declining complexity of terror attacks recorded between 2004 and 2016 (Von Dongen, 2016). It is controversial however whether individual recruits are manipulated by **organizations**. Some, as we have seen, rely on social networks and are recruited by family members or friends. Nevertheless, also prison can provide fertile ground for recruitment, as it offers opportunities for radicalization (Hamm, 2013). Moreover, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict there is growing recognition of the value of women's active contribution to the movement. In the past, on the contrary, **women** would at times be encouraged by their own family to join suicide missions only as a form of 'honor' suicide, or because unmarried. Calls have intensified for a new Palestinian woman – one who is not only the mother, sister or daughter of the martyr, but is a martyr herself (Hasso, 2005; Oliver, 2007; Narozhna and Knight, 2016).

Little agency is accorded to **individuals** who **join terrorist organizations**, as they are often described as victims of 'grooming' or brain-washing. While this may be true in some cases, certainly those who join attribute little significance to their worldly life, and it is not easy to determine whether they act or are acted upon (McDonald, 2013). Looking at personal histories, it would appear that it is the person who aspires to become a bomber who approaches the organization, not the other way round. The approach is aimed to achieve precise indication of a mission and of assistance to carry it out. Among the people imprisoned in the UK between 2001 and 2009 for planning or attempting to undertake terrorist-related violence, the majority had no identifiable links with terrorist-related organizations (Simcox et al, 2010).

In general, **knowledge** about the structure of terrorist networks remains **limited**, despite the fact that, since September 2001, interest in terrorist research has increased. Many studies are unempirical or anecdotal and some rely upon no evidence at all (Freilich, Chermak and Gruenewald, 2015). While a new book on terrorism is published every six hours (Silke, 2008), the approach of academic publications remains exploratory and documentary. Over the last years, however, research has engaged with measurement issues. The number of statistical studies has increased and large databases have been made available. The following section draws on some of these databases.

### 3.3. Activities

Increased research funding has contributed to the creation, maintenance and enhancement of **databases** on terrorist events, perpetrators and organizations, marking a significant increase in the number of quantitative studies. These include:

- American Terrorism Study
- Extremist Crime Database
- Global Terrorism Database
- International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
- Rand Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
- Minorities at Risk Organizational Behaviour
- Maryland University Database

Accessing **START**, the database managed by staff based at Maryland University, a gigantic list of attacks carried out across the world over the last thirty years or so is revealed. From this very large document, and focusing on the single day of 31 December 2015, three full pages of incidents are listed, namely sixty incidents.

The following information is found in one of these three pages.

- In Yemen assailants fired projectiles at a hospital in Al-Thawrah. There were no reported casualties in the attack. No group claimed responsibility, however, sources attributed the incident to the Huthis.
- In Saudi Arabia a rocket was fired at the Abba International Airport. No group claimed responsibility.
- In Egypt assailants fired projectiles at a civilian residence in Rafah City. At least five people were killed and another was injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.
- In Saudi Arabia assailants fired several rockets at residential areas in the Jazan region. At least three people were killed and eleven others were wounded in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.
- In the West Bank and Gaza Strip an assailant ran over an Israel Defense Forces soldier at the checkpoint in Hawara. The assailant was killed and the soldier was injured in the attack, however, sources identified the assailant, Hassan Bazour, as a Palestinian extremist.
- In Turkey an assailant threw a grenade at a soldier in the town of Kiziltepe. The assailant was killed in the ensuing clash. No group claimed responsibility, however, sources attributed the attack to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

- In Ukraine an explosive device detonated targeting a power pylon in the village of Bohdavinka. There were no reported casualties in the blast and the pylon was damaged. No groups claimed responsibility for the incident.
- In India assailants threw a grenade at a police station in the city of Srinagar. There were no reported casualties in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- In Germany assailants set fire to refugee housing near Hannover. There were no reported casualties. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- In Ethiopia assailants threw a grenade at students at Dilla University. At least two students were killed and six others were wounded in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- In the Philippines assailants fired a projectile at soldiers in the Datu Piang district. There were no reported casualties in the blast. This was one of three attacks targeting the military on the same day. No groups claimed responsibility, however, sources attributed the incidents to the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM).
- In Afghanistan assailants opened fire on Mullah Mohammad in the Khwaja Sabz Posh district. Mohammad, a school principal, was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility, however sources attributed the attack to the Taliban, which denied involvement.
- In Iraq an explosive device detonated targeting a military detachment in the Rasheed neighborhood of Bagdad. At least one soldier was killed and a second soldier was injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.
- In Pakistan an explosive device was discovered and defused in the town of Mand. No group claimed responsibility for the failed attack.
- In Pakistan assailants fired rockets that landed and detonated in the town of Mand. There were no reported casualties in the attack. The group Lashkar-e-Balochistan claimed responsibility for the incident.
- In Pakistan assailants in the Balochistan region fired two rockets that detonated near a police station. There were no reported casualties in the attack. The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility for the incident.
- In Burundi a grenade was thrown at a bar in Bujumbura. At least one person was killed and ten others were wounded in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- In Ireland an explosive device was discovered and defused in Cork. No group claimed responsibility for the potential attack.
- In the Philippines assailants opened fire on residents in the East Basak village. The village mayor and two police officers were wounded in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the assault.
- In Somalia assailants executed five suspected spies in the town of Saacow. No group claimed responsibility, however, sources attributed the attack to Al-Shabaab.
- In Libya twenty Egyptian civilians were abducted in the town of Zillah. No group claimed responsibility, however sources suspected that the attack was carried out by the Fezzan Province of the Islamic State. The attack was also attributed to Gaddafi loyalists.

In a miniature, this snapshot confirms data analyses of attacks indicating that **over 90 per cent of terrorist attacks are domestic**: 'nationals from one country attacking targets of the same nationality in the same country' (LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw, 2010: 121). Finally, it is noteworthy that terrorist acts perpetrated by states are excluded from this extremely detailed list.

### 3.4. Measures

For radical Islamism networks and foreign fighting, the typical age range for **recruitment** is 18 to 29 - although there are many instances to 15 to 16 years old been recruited as well as people of their 30s. The youngest US citizen arrested for Daesh-related activities was a 15-year-old boy. Two others were minors, aged 16 and 17 at the time of their arrests. The oldest was a former Air Force officer who was 47 at the time of his arrest. However, the average age of the American Daesh supporter at this time is 26 (Vidino L. and Hughes S., 2015). Almost all foreign terrorist fighters are male, although a certain number of women, particularly from Western countries, have been discovered among the radicalised (Nato, 2016). Those young women are prepared to become spouses of combatants in the regions where the organization rules. New combatants may also be recruited from the large repository of aggrieved Muslims resident in most western countries.

As a response to the recruitment, many large scale 'softer' policies were rolled out in the past decade, especially after the rise of militant Islamism and the attacks on European or US soil. Instead of focusing exclusively on the immediate prevention of attacks, these policies focus on **identifying and reversing the radicalisation process** which often precedes the use of violence (Dzhekova et al, 2015). An array of **preventive social measures** has therefore been implemented globally, to which we now turn in the following selective overview:

A form of Cyber propaganda is being used in Canada that addresses civil society and delivers messages and narratives opposed to those circulated by violent organizations. '**Cyber vigilantes**' are in operation exposing suspicious accounts of jihadi sympathizers and encouraging other users to report material that violates the law. Mock sympathizers are used to attract individuals seeking contacts with insurgents. Such social measures are meant to create obstacles to the process of radicalization which revolves around the rejection of western culture, blind submission to religious authority, claims of absolute truth and obsessive perceived injustice (Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009). Counter-narratives that challenge this motivational process are the main product of such initiatives.

Prevention is also pursued through targeting families, both those affected by the radicalization of one or more of their members and those who feel the need to protect their offspring from the radicalization process. **FAST** (Families Against Stress & Trauma) is one such initiative, engaged in making people aware of the risks of the Internet and exposure of young people to violent messages.

Although more controversial, the '**Prevent**' programme launched in the UK is inspired by similar aims, mobilizing in particular teachers and lecturers in the detection of embryonic signs of radicalization.

'**Agenfor Media**' is also engaged in preventing radical escalation, and produces videos and printed documents. These explain how to deal with vulnerable groups and individuals of Muslim faith from an Islamic perspective. The area of radicalization in prison is covered, while an informative social media channel is provided dealing with wars and insurgents in several regions. In its mission statement:

*'Agenfor Media is a not for profit network aiming to work in the overlapping contexts of development, humanitarian crises and human rights. Our goal is to ensure security through a better protection of human rights and socio-political participation with a particular focus on minorities, prisoners and other vulnerable groups. We are active in the field of counter-*

*radicalization with training courses and research activities addressing the needs of first-line practitioners from the public and private sectors all around Europe’.*<sup>1</sup>

Community-led (or social media) initiatives also take the form of testimonies and life stories of individuals affected by radicalization aiming to reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations. A UK programme named ‘**Channel**’ also aims at preventing at-risk young people from becoming radicalized, although critics argue that the government is doing little to promote learning and there is little transparency about how effective the programme is. Interventions in schools are variously delivered by psychologists, youth workers or former young radicals, with no evaluation to determine what might work best in different circumstances (The Observer, 24 January 2016).

Another programme with international success in the area of prevention of radicalization and on the long run of the prevention of early stages of extremism among vulnerable juveniles are the **Mothers schools**, initiatives running in countries highly affected by terror such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria and India but since 2015 also in Austria. With the entry point of parent-teacher conferences on so called hot spot schools, specifically qualified members of the organization “Women without Borders” conduct workshops to support concerned mothers – but also interested fathers – in detecting early signs of radicalization, constructive dialogue with their children but also support the active exchange of likeminded parents. Parents and specifically mothers were identified as playing a central role in prevention to reach out towards young people struggling in society before they might be recruited for violent ends. Although the target group in Austria seems a rather small one, every juvenile left alone with the propaganda of extremists was said to be one too much. Also, vocational training in regards of violence and radicalization prevention, intercultural learning and conflict management are offered to teachers in Austria with a great echo in the last years. In addition to this low threshold approach, psychologists at schools are also specifically sensitized to handle this issue.<sup>2</sup>

The project “**Taking Responsibility** – Breaking away from Hate and Violence”, aiming at deradicalization in prison, is active in Germany since 2001 and has specifically right-wing extremists but also Islamism oriented young violent offenders as target groups. Including NGOs and GOs as well, specific pedagogic approaches are used to implement new strategies to make it possible for the offenders to distance themselves from inhuman ideologies.<sup>3</sup>

Some of these **initiatives** have raised considerable **controversy**. For instance, some terrorism prevention schemes have been located within the ‘**pre-crime**’ **strategies** adopted in many western countries. These strategies are said to centre state action on sheer suspicion, whereby individuals and groups are targeted without a specific charge being formulated. Anticipating risk, in this sense, tends to integrate national security into criminal justice, to the detriment of civil and political rights (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). Anti-terrorism, from this perspective, becomes a threat to democracy (Wolfendale, 2007; Zedner, 2000).

**Technical preventative measures** adopted by Europe include exchange of DNA data, which is also carried out in the fight of cross-border crime in the EU (Santos and Machado, 2016), along with the

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.agenformedia.com/dossier/preventing-radical-escalations>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.frauen-ohne-grenzen.org/projekte/laufende/42/>

<sup>3</sup> <http://violence-prevention-network.de/en/projects/deradicalisation-in-prison> best practice sheet: <http://violence-prevention-network.de/en/component/phocadownload/category/1-publikationen?download=15:brochure-taking-responsibility-breaking-away-from-hate-and-violence>

introduction of new counter-terrorism legislation in most member states. Other forms of prevention fall into the arena of **finance** and address the legitimate or illegitimate acts through which terrorist organizations support their propaganda, attacks and the reproduction of their own networks (Hamm, 2007).

Waging **war and assassinations** are, finally, a recurrent form of counter-terrorism. The American military experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria is recounted in many books and articles, but only rarely is it 'glorified' (Williams, 2016). Most literature oscillates mainly between suggestions to deal with terrorism through the rule of law and **deprecation** for unnecessary **military intervention**. Let us see some examples:

Politicians are said to feed on people's anxieties and offer palliative medication that reinforces paranoia and promotes xenophobia. Isis, it is remarked, benefits from the same reservoir of anxiety and fear. States reacting with pure military force are said to imitate the illusions and delusions of those groups or individuals they are trying to combat (English, 2016). Pre-emptive intelligence is advocated, as a light touch alternative to the 'bludgeon' of state power. There are in the literature also accounts that underplay the threat of terrorism to an extent that the whole phenomenon is described as a 'moral panic', a craze similar to the worst historical examples of witch hunting (Mueller and Stewart, 2016; Ramadan and Shantz, 2016). But many contributions highlight the dangers of what is termed a 'forever war'. A book published by Mark Danner (2016), a US top military officer and commander in chief, has warned that 'a perpetual war through drones or special forces or troop deployments will prove self-defeating and alter our country in troubling ways' (Ignatieff, 2016: 86). In Danner's view, the self-proclaimed 'exceptional nation' now finds itself trapped in a permanent state of exception, a spiral of self-defeating policies that are carrying the US away from its initial purpose: the reduction of terrorism.

Danner's argument is echoed by authors who, before him, attempted to prove empirically the **failure of counter-terrorism policies**, which are described as mere 'fruitful spectacles' (de Lint and Kassa, 2015). In the UK a study has examined the emotional impact of counter-terrorist strategies on Muslim communities, while several authors have focused on how such strategies increase fear and encourage **suspicion** and **racism** (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Ahmed, 2015; Abbas and Awan, 2015).

Finally, counter-terrorist wars have also been judged as serious obstacles to the delivery of **humanitarian aids** (Gill, 2016). It should be added that, when there is a disconnect between the depiction of terrorist threat as presented by official agencies and the perception of large sectors of the public, responses to terror attacks fail to gain the support they would need (Smith et al, 2016). The disconnect is likely to widen, at least in the UK, after the publication of the so-called Chilcot Report, showing the disastrous outcome of the institutional deceit leading to the invasion of Iraq (Chilcot, 2016; Wheatcroft, 2016).

Analyses of the **unintended consequences** of policy interventions and strategic tactics suggest that 'sometimes these interventions have created backlash effects that led to greater numbers of crimes' (Chermak, Freilich and Caspi, 2010: 139). As an alternative, participation of extremists (or those they purportedly represent) in policymaking is advocated: 'States that allow participation of individuals and groups in formal politics will reduce grievances or strain and thus willingness to use terrorism as a useful tactic' (Dugan and Young, 2010: 164).

‘Say the word “war” and the rule of law often implodes, with court frequently employing sophistry to avoid any interference with governmental conduct’ (Rakoff, 2016: 80). This is the view, among others, of distinguished law experts, who find themselves in disagreement when the judiciary avoids to scrutinize anything ‘embarrassing’ from far-reaching surveillance to torture or the use of drones (Todorov, 2009; Fiss, 2016).

Equal controversy surrounds the use of ‘disposition matrix’ or ‘kill lists’ that spell out who has to be hit by a long-distance unmanned missile (Hayden, 2016). And **drones**, indeed, are the ultimate area of controversy surrounding institutional responses to terrorism. Regarded by some as an attempt to shift towards a cheaper method of targeted assassinations, drones are depicted by others as the ultimate examples of summary executions to which any democracy should never resort (Cockburn, 2015; Cortwright et al, 2015; Scahill, 2016; Bergen and Rothenberg, 2016).

## 4. Hybrids

The Islamic State of Iraq is reputed to complement its military capability with functioning infrastructures and profitable activity in economic ventures as well as in crime. Its large extortion enterprise in the midst of the chaos of the Gulf and the Middle East is pinpointed as an example of the increasing **overlap, relationship or coincidence of terrorism and organized crime** (Whiteside, 2016). This section is devoted to the analysis of the relevant literature on this controversial relationship.

Over the past decades, undeniable evidence showed that organized **political groups**, in order to **finance** their activity, resorted to forms of **serious criminality**, such as bank robberies and kidnappings. It was, however, also evident that groups purporting to represent disadvantaged communities would avoid involvement in activities that might damage those very communities. Moralistic and 'Robin Hoodesque' in their own self-perception, ideally, political groups would opt for 'robbing the robbers', namely the wealthy who are favoured by the exploitative system against which political action is addressed. Lucrative hold ups, for example, or kidnappings of tycoons, according to this logic, would be the preferred sources of financing for violent political organizations (Aust, 1987; Curcio, 1993; Moretti, 1994; Varon, 2004).

**Contemporary terrorists**, however, appear to **ignore ethical boundaries** and along with offences aimed at the material reproduction of their organization, they are said to engage in crimes that their predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s would find repellent: espionage, drug smuggling, gun running, money laundering, cell phone and credit card theft, immigration violations, extortion and prostitution (Hamm, 2007). On the other hand, it is argued that contemporary perpetrators of terrorist acts are rarely drawn from the offender population, nor do they consider themselves common criminals. Instead, they often see themselves as freedom fighters whose unlawful acts are motivated by a just cause and not by personal gain (Hoffman, 2006). Evidence and opinions vary in this respect, as the sketches below indicate.

With the purpose of reproducing themselves, **terrorist groups** may acquire expertise in **conventional criminality** and through this pursue a form of '**empire-building**' that transcends their original political goal. Groups who cease their operations, moreover, may find at their disposal not only expertise and unlawful skills, but also arms, and after the dismissal of their organization may use what they possess to start a career in **criminal markets** (Silke, 2000). By contrast, the assimilation of terrorism to organized criminality can be seen as a clumsy attempt to degrade the 'enemies' whoever they might be, depicting them as an undistinguishable mob in the face of which quibbling differences may just obstruct the criminal justice process (Ruggiero, 2010b).

In general, **organized crime** uses **violence** as a **supplementary tool** for negotiating their presence on markets, or with the official system. **Violent political groups**, on the contrary, use **violence** as a **signal** of their **unwillingness** to **negotiate** with a **system** they would rather demolish. Their action, therefore, transcends the immediate result they achieve, and prefigures, realistically or not, a different set of achievements which will be valued in a future, rather than in the current society. Of course, some political groups may use violence as a supplementary form of pressure to accelerate a specific negotiation and pursue a concrete, material objective. But in this case, the violence exercised may be deemed a form of 'armed trade unionism'.

While the word ‘terrorism’ is not even mentioned in the detailed index of a recent important handbook on organized crime (Paoli, 2014), the phrase ‘organized crime’ recurs in many contemporary contributions on political violence and terrorism. This may be because both forms of crime are analysed against the variables offered by the **sociology of organizations**, which offers useful conceptualizations for the understanding of collective behaviour in delimited structures. **Terrorism and organized crime**, in this respect, may be similar because both deploy an **organizational layout**. An objection, in this respect, could be that any group of people acting in concert can be viewed as a social organization; therefore not only organized crime and terrorism lend themselves to a joint analysis, but any aggregation of individuals who perform collective action.

Some authors, however, see more specific common elements in the two, arguing that they may engage in **similar activity**, or ‘**relate symbiotically**’, as when they exchange drugs for weapons’ (Grabosky and Stohl, 2010). Moreover, the two have developed **networked organizational forms** and **technological skills** that enhance their capacity and resilience. The **interface** between organized crime and terrorism, as suggested by Grabosky and Stohl (2010), is said to take the following forms:

- *‘Terrorists may engage in conventional criminality to support themselves and their operations. Al-Qaeda has engaged in credit card fraud; Abu Sayyaf in ransom kidnapping. Profits from cigarette smuggling in the United States have gone to support Hezbollah.*
- *Organized criminals may seek to coerce and intimidate governments and their citizens for political ends. The assassination of Sicilian investigating judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992 were more than just mafia ‘hits’, the massive explosions themselves constituted a political statement, and were obviously intended to discourage further investigative activity.*
- *Ordinary criminals may become increasingly politicized, and eventually convert to terrorism. José Padilla, a US citizen convicted after 9/11 of aiding terrorists, was, in his youth, a member of a Chicago street gang. Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, was a petty criminal before he turned to political violence in 2004.*
- *Terrorists may abandon their political agendas and turn to conventional crime. The term ‘fighters turned felons’ capture this nicely. One of the largest bank robberies in UK history was allegedly committed to finance the retirement of IRA activists in 2004 following the peace accords in Northern Ireland.*
- *Terrorists and criminal organizations may exchange knowledge and commodities for mutual benefit. Thai criminals sell weapons to insurgents. [There are] ‘marriages of convenience’ such as the relationship between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Colombian drug dealers. JI in Indonesia literally married into the criminal class, with a senior member marrying a major arms merchant to ensure continuing supply of arms.*
- *Some hybrid organizations may engage in both terrorist and criminal activity. The Indian organized crime syndicate D-Company is alleged to have been involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, and a bombing in Mumbai that killed 257 people in 1993’.* (Grabosky and Stohl, 2010: 6-7)

The **similarities** between organized crime and terrorism are particularly emphasized by **law enforcement agencies**, which include within their remit the support of member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime through the exchange of criminal intelligence (Europol, 2015). Perhaps the concern and focus on ‘**serious international crime**’, inevitably, leads

agencies to adopt a joint approach to the two. The British National Crime Agency (NCA) follows the same route, providing a general definition that embraces a considerable range of groups and activities, some of which could be labelled organized crime while some terrorist organizations. To overcome this type of ambiguity, the following phrase referred to organized crime as opposed to terrorism has been proposed: 'Their primary motivation is usually financial gain' (Holmes, 2016: 14).

A historical perspective of the evolving issue with solid background work useful for current research can be found in the **comparative survey of organized crime and terrorism** that was compiled by Glaeßner and Lorenz (2005), while Zöller (2013) provided a summary of the blurred borders between terrorism and organized crime from the perspective of legal prosecution and law enforcement measures.

If the **focus** is on **illegal structures** rather than illegal activities, the concern is how organizations relate to states. Attempts to influence state officials are commonly made by organized criminals, who mainly pursue impunity for their offences and, when engaged in the official economy, seek contracts to carry out some form of state-funded public work (Abadinsky, 2013). The goal is, in such cases, of an economic rather than a political nature. 'Commonly, the **lack of political goals** is seen as a defining characteristic of organized crime that distinguishes it from ideologically and religiously motivated terrorist and insurgent groups' (von Lampe, 2016: 263).

This notwithstanding, some authors see a **nexus between terrorism and organized crime** in that the former have either assumed the **characteristics** and criminal **activities** of the latter or have established collaborative **relationships** with them (Makarenko, 2014; Shelley, 2014). It should be borne in mind, however, that the **literature** proposing a joint analysis of organized crime and terrorism is still in its infancy and that a **lack of consensus** persists on its very **adequacy**. In a distinction highlighted by Campbell (2014: 230):

*'Whether organized crime is interpreted in a structural or substantive way, it appears to be motivated by the accumulation of wealth. Though the evasion or neutering of state control and the corruption of officials may assist in the criminal enterprise, the generation of profit and the control of illicit markets is the primary focus of organized crime rather than any grasping of power for political ends'.*

Conversely, terrorism is defined by the same author as 'violence motivated by political, ideological, or philosophical considerations, aimed at civilians to generate fear and cause damage, and to coerce a government to act in a particular manner' (ibid). Although some similarities between organized crime and terrorism may be detected in their (at times) hierarchical structures and use of violent means to achieve ends, a hasty unification of the two phenomena, it is felt, may lead to potentially ineffective preventative and enforcement measures (Levi, 2014; Sergi, 2016).

This important distinction notwithstanding, some empirical studies do show that **terrorist organizations** may, when convenient, procure the **services of criminal groups** to further their political goals (Sverdlick, 2005; Picarelli, 2006; Roth and Sever, 2006; Gallagher, 2016). For example, a case-study of narco-terrorism in Colombia by Bibes (2001) indicates that, over the past thirty years, leftist guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitaries have largely depended on drug cartels to help finance their political objectives. Bibes also describes instances where cartel leaders have in turn hired terrorist groups to carry out violent acts to achieve their own goals. Similarly, a study of Mali's Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) proves that this terrorist organization, while principally

aiming at disposing of the Mali government and establishing a caliphate, does act in conjunction with narco-traffickers (Boeke, 2016).

Suggestions are also made that formerly politically motivated terrorist groups can develop conventional economically motivated organized crime syndicates (Hausken and Gupta, 2016). This development, however, is said to take place when terrorist organizations cease to be funded by benefactors and donors. Thus, following an end of hostilities with the state, members of the Colombian FARC and the provisional Irish Republican Army, it is assumed, have turned into purely profit-seeking organizations, relying on their terrorist skills to accumulate wealth (Byrne, 2009).

## 5. Conclusions

As it was highlighted in the previous sections, organized crime and terrorist networks represent a serious threat for the European Union as well as on a global level. Based on a critical reflection of relevant literature, the review highlighted the most relevant approaches offered by scientific scholars on both phenomena.

Depending on the theoretical background and the empirical approach, the approaches provide both complementary as well as diverging explanations – especially regarding the causes, the structures and activities of organized crime and terrorist networks. Furthermore, some scholars are also highlighting the nexus between the two phenomena. But although approaches emphasize the similarities between them are currently gaining popularity, other scholars point out that there are fundamental variations and hence it is crucial to separate them analytically.

The literature review showed furthermore the need for more empirical research on both phenomena. Although empirical research in the field of organized crime is relying on quantitative data to a large extend, it is already well-established. In contrast, the literature on terrorist networks and political violence is built on limited empirical data.

In addition to the need for more empirical research on both issues, the literature furthermore identifies several policy and institutional obstacles for tackling organized crime and terrorist networks (Marion 2010; Raab and Milward, 2003):

- *Lack of Cooperation.* The various political treaties and strategies for fighting organized crime and terrorist networks mostly remain in the status of intentions, which are powdered due to national interests.
- *Lack of Skilled Technical Staff, Expertise and Tools.* Taking Cold Boot attacks as an example, Law Enforcement Agencies need to have experts and the tools for decrypting information in case a suspect is caught. However, only few countries have the necessary types of technologies for doing that and only a few professionals have the skills to use them.
- *Lack of Communication.* As recent terrorist attacks in Europe showed, national authorities do not communicate with each other or exchange data on suspects or even convicts and hence it becomes very difficult to track criminals or prevent attacks.

The structured analysis of the literature, which was presented in this report, is providing a profound basis and the general direction for the work that is done in WP2 of the TAKEDOWN project. Furthermore, it will also be taken into account for the empirical research that is done in WP3. The analysis and the suggestions will be feed into the quantitative survey as well as into the qualitative approaches such as the expert interviews, workshops and focus groups.

The literature from this report as well as further literature will be available in an Online Bibliography, which can be accessed through the TAKEDOWN project-website.

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